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to allow the donor to dispose of his property as he desres. In addition, it guards
against fraud by requiring that the donor s intention be shown with reasonable
certainty. It is honest and to the point, in that it does not deal in the confusing
inter rovos language so often employed by most courts. It provides the individual
with a relatively simple and safe method of making a death-bed donation, and
above all it allows him to die with a reasonable hope that his last wishes will be
respected.
JAMS V MARcUMd
DELEGATION OF POWER TO FIX PREVAILING WAGES
WITH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT AS
THE STANDARD
Fear that the economic power of the State as employer and contractor might
be utilized to undermine hard-fought-for wage scales has caused labor leaders to
press for legislation to prevent such a threat. In response to tins influence the
Kentucky legislature has enacted a statute which regulates the wages of work-
men engaged in construction work of a public nature in Kentucky. This so-called
"prevailing wage" statute is as follows:
"Before advertising for bids or entering into any contract
for construction of public works, every public authority shall ascertain
the prevailing rates of wages of laborers, workmen, mechanics, helpers,
assistants and apprentices for the class of work called for in the con-
struction of such public works in the locality where the work is to be
performed. This schedule of wages shall be attached to and made a
part of the specifications for the work and shall be printed on the
bidding blanks and made a part of every contract for the construction
of public works."'
"The wages paid for a legal day s work to laborers, work-
men, mechanics, helpers, assistants and apprentices upon public works
shall not be less than the prevailing wages paid in the same trade or
occupation in the locality. The public authority shall establish pre-
vailing wages at the same rate that prevails in the locality under col-
lective agreements or understandings between bona fide orgamza-
tions of labor and their employers at the date the contract for public
works is made if there are such agreements or understandings in the
locality applying to a sufficient number of employees to furnish a
reasonable basis for considering those rates to be the prevailing rates
in the locality. -2
In the recent case of Baughn v. Gorrell & Riley these two sections of this act
were held constitutional by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in the face of an at-
tack that the act made an unlawful delegation of legislative power to a private
interest to regulate or fix wages.' This note will make an examnation of this de-
cision and analogous cases in the light of a general consideration of the problem
of delegation of legislative power in an effort to determine the soundness of this
holding of the Kentucky Court.
'Ky. RiEv. STAT. sec. 837.510 (1948).
22 Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 337.520 (1948).
8Baughn v. Gorrell & Riley, 311 Ky. 537, 224 S.W 2d 436 (1949).
NOTES AND COMENTS
In the Baughn case suit was filed against a county school board and a con-
tractor engaged in the reconstruction of a school building, with the primary ob-
jectives of cancelling the contract between the board and the contractor and
forcing compliance with the above statute m ascertaining and fixing the prevailing
rates of wages for the work to be performed. The controversy arose through the
failure of the board to comply with the prevailing wage" statute and the con-
tractor s payment to certain classes of labor less than the prevailing wages for
similar work in the city of Owensboro, located about fourteen miles from the site
of the building. The lower court upheld the contention of the contractor that
the statute was an unconstitutional delegation of the exercise of the legislative
function to pnvate interests, i.e., labor umons. On appeal there was no disagree-
ment with the basic rule of law advanced that the delegation of legislative power
to private interests would result m the unconstitutionality of the statute. The
division of minds in the Court arose in the interpretation of the statute. A majority
of the Court in reversing held that this was not a delegation of legislative power
to regulate wages to a labor union and in upholding the constitutionality of the
statute stated their conclusions as follows:
"The statute involved fixes the legislative policy. It estab-
lishes a standard, which we cannot say is unreasonable, to guide the
public authorities. The public body is vested with a discretion in de-
termimng the reasonable prevailing wage which must be included, if
any must be included, in the contract. These three factors being
present, we find the Legislature has not delegated the exercise of its
legislative function to private persons or interests."'
The dissent agreed that the legislature could fix or delegate to a public body
the power to determine the prevailing wages for public works but argued that
the statute passed such determination to a private group leaving the public
authorities without the right or power to decide their reasonableness.
Wagner v. City of Milwaukee," cited as authority by the appellee, concerned
substantially identical facts except that the prevailing wage provision appeared in
an ordinance rather than in a statute. The ordinance provided that:
" all skilled laborers employed on any work done by
or for the city or for any contractor or subcontractor performing work
for the city shall be paid a sum wich shall not be less than the
prevailing wage in tls city for such skilled labor; said prevailing
wage to be determined by the wage paid to members of any regular
and recoguized orgamzation of such skilled laborers for such skilled
labor, which prevailing wage shall be the minimum price paid to all
skilled laborers hereafter provided such prevailing wage shall
first be determined and approved by a majority vote of the members
of the common council. "a
The ordinance and a resolution adopted thereunder were held to be void as
a surrender by the common council of the exercise of their judgment and an agree-
ment to be bound by the wage scale determined by the labor unions if they
chose to act on the subject. The end result of the ordinance vesting the de-
termination of such a legislative function in a private group was held to be abdica-
'Id. at 542, 224 S.W 2d at 439.
'177 Wis. 410, 188 N.W 487 (1922).
8 Ibid.
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tion, and not exercise, of a discretion belonging exclusively to the common council.
The dissenting opinion was unable to find an authorized delegation of legislative
power. On the contrary, it stated that this was nothing more than a delegation of
power to find a fact, which was not a legislative function.
"The legislative declaration is that skilled laborers
shall be paid not less than the prevailing wage. That
is the legislative declaration, and as legislation it is full and complete.
Manifestly the determination of what is the prevailing wage at any
given time involves the ascertainment of a fact. The common council
cannot by its fiat establish the prevailing wage. That is established
by various industrial and economic forces. The ascertainment of a
fact is not a legislative function."'
"If there is any delegation of power it is the power
to ascertain facts, to wit, the prevailing wage. Tis is not legislative,
and it may be delegated. It is not uncommon for statutes to declare
the legislative will in general terms under circumstances making the
ascertainment of facts necessary in order to determine where and
when the law is operative. In such cases it is held competent for the
Legislature to prescribe how, when, and by whom such facts shall be
determined. s
The Kentucky Court, after stating that it did not agree with the reasoning
of the majority opinion in the Wagner case, pointed out the following grounds for
distinguishing the two cases: (1) At the time umon rates were not generally ac-
cepted as a prevailing wage as they are today, and (2) the construction of
the controlling legislation. In disposing of the Wagner case, the Court merely
mentioned these two factors without providing a detailed explanation of either;
but it is clear that what the Court did was to take this opportunity to construe
the Kentucky statute in the light of our more recent understanding of the ad-
ministrative process and flatly reject the Wagner case.
Two possible approaches or viewpoints which may be taken toward the con-
stitutionality of such an attempted delegation of authority are illustrated by the
Baughn and Wagner decisions. First, from the decision in the Baughn case and
the dissent of the Wagner case comes the idea that such an attempted delegation
is constitutional because it results simply in the delegation of authority to an ad-
ministrative board to find a fact under the specified standard to carry out the leg-
islative policy declared in the act. Second, from the dissent in the Baughn case
and the decision in the Wagner case comes the view that such an attempted dele-
gation is unconstitutional as in effect it is an unlawful abdication of legislative
power to fix wages to a private group.
A consideration of the background of wage regulation as to public employees
will aid in an understanding of the problem. The legislature may validly fix mm-
imun wages to be paid laborers on public works or it may properly grant to pub-
lic authorities the discretionary power of fixing prevailing wage rates. Minimum
wage statutes applicable to public works have been generally sustained on the
theory that the state as employer having full control of the terms and conditions
under which it will contract may, through its legislature, and within constitutional
limitations, provide the wage which shall be paid to employees.' There has been
Id. at -- 188 N.W at 490.
8 Id. at - 188 N.W at 491.
9See 50 A. L. R. 1480 (n. 27); 81 A. L. R. 349 (1932).
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a greater controversy over the establishment of minimum wages to be paid by
contractors on public works, although the tendency is to sustain this power of the
state.'" In support of legislation governing the rmmum wage to be paid by a
contractor the majority view holds that the legislature, in regulating the wages
of these employees on public works, is exercising the employer s power to pre-
scribe the terms under which the employees will be hired." At one time this power
was generally denied. It was argued that the invalidity resulted from the expendi-
ture of public funds for other than public purposes,' the abridgement of the free-
dom to contract," the granting of special privileges to individuals or classes,' the
taking of property without due process of law," and the giving away of public
funds indirectly through prescribed terms less favorable than those resulting from
competition." Most of the later decisions recognize the power to fix wage scales
arguing from the basis that the employer can control the contractual terms. The
nght or power of a public authority to fix a minimum wage to be paid by con-
tractors on public works involves consideration of the delegated legislative author-
ity to act and the possibility of violation of constitutional guaranties. The later
view is that the fixing of wage scales is a legitimate field for the exercise of leg-
islative power.
Considering the Baughn case, m the light of the general authority on the
delegation of legislative authority to determine prevailing wages for public works,
the problem is resolved into whether or not there is a sufficient declaration of
policy and standard in the statute to control the acts of the public body. Neces-
sarily the validity of such delegation depends on the language of the particular
grant. It is believed that a sufficient policy and standard were set out in the
Kentucky "prevailing wage" statute to sustain the majority finding. A Califorma
court, after upholding the power of the legislature to let public authorities fix
minimum wages for public works, considered the terms of a California statute as
to sufficiency of standard, and concluded that the term "general prevailing rate
of per diem wages," within the act requinng it as the minimum wage for work-
men on public works, was not too uncertain a standard. The phrase "work of a
similar nature," within the same statute, was held to be sufficiently definite as was
"locality in which work is to be performed."" The Kentucky statute is even more
definite as to standard since it prescribes that wage which at the present time will
generally be found to be prevailing, i.e., union rates.
It is permissible for the legislature to delegate the power to determine facts
or conditions upon which the operation of a statute is contingent. The legislature
may also delegate to a public authority, the power to detenmne the existence of
certain facts, and to carry out the statute according to those facts. This is not in-
valid as a delegation of the legislative function.' If the action of the official or
agency authorized to act does not in effect decide what the law shall be, but only
" Campbell v. City of N. Y., 244 N. Y. 317, 155 N.E. 628 (1927); Malette v.
City of Spokane, 77 Wash. 205, 137 p. 496 (1913).
nMalette v. Spokane, 77 Wash. 205, 137 p. 496 (1913); 81 A. L. R. 349
(1932).
(1 See Reid v. Smith, 375 M. 147, 30 N.E. 2d 908 (1940).
' State ex rel Bramley v. Norton, 7 Oio Dec. N. P. 354 (1897).
" Street v. Varney Electrical Supply Co., 160 Ind. 838, 66 N.E. 895 (1903).
'Wright v. Hoctor, 95 Neb. 342, 145 N.W 704 (1914).
'3See note 12 supra.
"Metropolitan Water District v. Whitsett, 215 Cal. 400, 10 P 2d 751 (1932).
'311 Am. Jur. 926.
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determines within the prescribed limits some fact upon which the law by its own
terms operates, such action is administrative and not legislative in nature. A broad
general rule is that the legislature may delegate any non-legislative power which
it may itself exercise."0 Mere matters of detail within the policy and standards
established by the statute are basically ministerial rather than legislative. Where
the act sufficiently sets out the legislative purpose and leaves the admimstrative
details to another agency, it is not subject to the objection that it delegates leg-
islative power. The mere fact that the subordinate body is granted discretion in
the exercise of the power conferred by statute does not necessarily mean that the
discretion amounts to the use of legislative power, so as to render the delegation
invalid. -'
Kentucky s "prevailing wage" statute delegated to a public body the author-
ity to find a fact and that fact was to be used in the manner prescribed by statute.
The only discretion allowed was as to the reasonableness in considerng the col-
lective agreement rate as prevalent. This discretion is perhaps necessary to keep
the standard from being arbitrary and unreasonable. The legislature granted the
public authority no power in making the law. The most that can be said of the
function of the public authority is that it had authority to determne the fact which
the legislation applies. There is no legislative discretion m the finding of an eco-
nomic fact such as a prevailing wage under a policy and standard. The function
granted to the public authority could and should be considered the delegation of
power to find an admimstrative fact and no more.
The legislature cannot delegate the exercise of its legislative functions to
private persons or interests.' At the present time legislatures, to a great extent,
confine their actions to formulating general policies, leaving to other agencies
the task of promulgating the details necessary to effectuate the legislative intent.
So long as the policy is laid down and the standard is established by statute, no
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power is involved in leaving to named
instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within the prescribed limits and
the finding of facts to which the declared policy is applicable. Where the legisla-
tion does not limit the activities of private interests to being heard, but allows
them to initiate, approve or determine substance, a question arises as to the
validity of such delegation. Similarly the question is involved in attempted dele-
gations directly to private persons or groups. The problem is deciding what
amounts to a delegation of legislative power.
One type of statute allows an agency to formulate the rules and regulations
involved under a prescribed policy and standard but permits the participation of
private groups in this rule-making process. Another attempts a direct delegation
of the rule-making function to the private interests. As to the former, the cases
have distinguished between those statutes which grant private groups power to
initiate that which is to be promulgated by the public authority and those calling
for approval by private interests of the rules formulated before it is issued. While
statutes depending upon the initiative of private groups for the action of the
public authority have been invalidated as improper delegation," those requiring
'Steele v. Louisville & N. R. R., 154 Term. 208, 285 S.W 582 (1926);
Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Railroad Commission, 136 Wis. 146, 116
N.W 905 (1908).
"Livesay v. De Armond, 131 Or. 563, 284 P. 166 (1930).
"11 AM. Jim. 931, 932.
"Gibson Auto Co. v. Finnegan, 217 Wis. 401, 259 N.W 420 (1935); Chester
C. Fosgate Co. V Kirkland, 19 F Supp. 152 (D.C. Fla. 1937).
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approval of private interests before the statute becomes effective have been held
valid.' In both instances the private interests affected by the possible action can
prevent it.
The question of the constitutionality of a statute allowing a public body to
promulgate regulations after the participation of private groups in the legislative
process is an issue independent from that of the failure to provide sufficient stand-
ards of guidance to validate delegated authority. Legislation may not be subject
to the latter objection, and be invalid as to the former, or it may be invalid as to
both. An implication from Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States might be that
where the public authority has inadequate standards, correction cannot come
from the action of private interests, because such delegation to the private groups
would in itself be improper.'
Statutes which place the power of initiation of rules pertaining to wages,
hours, etc., in private groups and limit the action of the public body to mere ap-
proval or disapproval, have been held to be improper delegationsY Where the
statute permits the appropriate body to act on its own initiative under proper
standards, it is not, an improper delegation to private interests merely because it
allows private groups to initiate such rules and regulations.'
Statutes empowering a public authority to effectuate a legislative policy on
wages, hours or prices, under proper statutory standards, is not invalid as delega-
tion of legislative power to private interests because by its terms such legislation
is to take effect only on the approval of certain private groups. Currn v. Wallace"r
upheld the validity of such a statute and distinguished Carter v. Carter Coal Co.'
upon the ground that this was not a situation where a majority could make the
law and subject a minority to its provisions.
A legislative enactment directly conferring the exercise of the legislative
function upon private individuals or interests is considered an invalid delegation
of legislative authority. The provisions of the Federal Bituminous Conservation
Act of 1935 which authorized a certain percentage of the producers and miners to
fix maximum hours and mimmum wages for particular districts were held to be
invalid delegations of legislative power to those groups in the Carter Coal case.n
In effect, the act made acceptance of the standards compulsory by a tax provision
containing a rebate clause and a provision that the United States, and contractors
with the United States, should not buy bituminous coal from producers not com-
plying with the prescribed code.
Considering the statute in the Baughn case, in the light of the power of a
private interest to initiate or approve legislation or a direct power to legislate,
there is notlung invalid in the statute. The legislature in enacting the statute has
relied on their power to fix a minmum wage for the employees on public works
or to delegate that power to a public body. They recognized the need for a legis-
lative policy and standard in order for the delegation to a subordinate body to be
valid. In selecting the standard they gave due regard to the active economic and
'Brock v. Superior Ct., 9 Cal. 2d 291, 71 P. 2d 209 (1937).
'295 U.S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570 (1935).
Hollingsworth v. State Board of Barber Examiners, 217 Ind. 373, 28 N.E.
2d 64 (1940); Revne v. Trade Commission, -- Utah -- 192 P. 2d 563 (1948).
'Arnoldv. Board of Barber Examiners, 45 N. M. 57, 109 P. 2d 779 (1941).
'306 U.S. 1, 59 Sup. Ct. 379, 83 L. Ed. 441 (1939).
1298 U.S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160 (1936).
lb id.
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industrial forces that, today, determine to a large extent the prevailing wage in
almost every locality. Today tihe union wage comes close to being the prevailing
wage. Recognition is also given to the fact that the standard cannot be arbitrary
and unreasonable. This is found in the discretion granted to public authority to
determine whether the collective agreement covers a sufficient number of workmen
to make its scale the prevailing wage. The public authority is the body em-
powered to ascertain the prevailing wage existing in the locality. Under this
statute there is no grant of legislative authority to a labor umon to declare what
the "prevailing wage" shall be. There is not even a remote suggestion that the
establishment of the wage requires union approval of the public body s finding.
There is not a direct delegation to the labor umon in the sense that the decision
as to the wage rate is surrendered to it for formulation or promulgation. The
authority to find a definite fact is delegated to the public authority. Such a
statute exerts little or no influence on the collective bargaining agreement between
the employer and the umon. Economic factors and forces, social policy, and sheer
power determine the wage rate in the collective agreement. This results in a re-
adjustment of those same forces in relation to the agreement. The wage rate in
the collective agreement was adopted as the standard by which the ultimate
authority was to be guided.
The delegation of power to the public authority to find the prevailing wage,
with the collective agreement rate as a standard, is not an invalid grant of legis-
lative power to labor unions. It is believed that such a contention will fall before
the arguments of the Baughn case and the dissent in the Wagner case. The Court
found sufficient legislative policy and standard to support a delegation of authority
to a public body. The duty was imposed to determine and fix the local prevailing
wage. The standard is set as the wage agreement between labor umons and em-
ployers at the date of the contract. The discretion placed m the public body is
the power to determine whether or not the collective agreement covers a sufficient
number of employers for the rate therein to be considered a "prevailing wage."
The ultimate decision as to the prevailing rate resides in the public authority As
stated before the legislature may prescribe the wage rate for public works. A dis-
cretionary power may properly be granted to public authorities to fix a prevailing
wage for public works. If thus discretionary power may be delegated, it must fol-
low that authority to find a prevailing wage, according to a reasonable and specific
standard, subject to the discretion of the public body as to the reasonableness of
its existence, may be granted to a public body. The Court should not invalidate a
standard merely because it doubts the soundness of the legislative policy.'
The legislature has sufficiently declared the policy and standard under which
the public authority is to find a fact. The legislature could find this fact for it is
merely mimsterial. The legislature can delegate a non-legislative function vhich
itself could have exercised. A prevailing wage is an economic fact. It is a fact
that rises from the interplay of economic forces and not merely from the demand
of the legislature. Thus, at any given time it is necessary to determine as a fact
what the prevailing wage is. No legislative discretion is involved in the finding
of a mere fact, for the ascertainment of a fact is not a legislative function. In 1922
when the Wagner case was decided, it is doubtful if a union rate was a common
wage. Today, it is possible and quite probable that the umon scale would be a
fair criteria for determimng a local prevailing wage. Naturally, matters of public
'Craig v. O'Rear, 199 Ky. 553, 251 S.W 828 (1923).
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policy enter into the adoption of such a standard. Perhaps, the benefit of well
paid labor justifies employment on terms less favorable than those resulting from
competition. This is the decision of the legislature as shown by its action in
adopting such a standard. The only function delegated by the legislature was the
finding of an economic fact which the statute applies automatically.
DEMPSEY A. Cox
FINANCIAL INABILITY AS A DEFENSE UNDER
THE CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE
It is a well recognized concept in the law of corporations that a director
stands in a fiduciary relation to his corporation and has the duty to act m the
utmost good faith to promote the corporation s interest and business. A problem
of some difficulty which has emerged out of this duty of loyalty on the part
of directors is the extent to which a director may take for himself a particular
business opportunity which falls within the general scope of the corporation s
business. In determimng whether a director has the right to usurp a business
opportunity the test has been said to be whether there is a specific duty to act
or contract in regard to the particular matter as a representative of the corpora-
tion.' An important factor m determinng this duty is the financial ability of the
corporation to enter into the particular business transaction.
The important part financial inability may play in this respect is illustrated
in the recent Kentucky case of Urban J. Alexander Co. v. Trnkle.' The Alexander
Co. was organized in 1932 to engage in the investment and brokerage business.
In 1943 Tinkle, the manager of the company secured an option in his own
name to sell all the capital stock of Independent Ice and Coal Co. Tinkle was
unable to obtain a purchaser and the option lapsed. A year later, Trinkle entered
into a partnership with Hofgesang to purchase the stock, Trinkle obtained another
option and sold the stock to the partnership. On the sale of the Independent Ice
and Coal Co. the partnership realized a profit of $80,000.00. The corporation
brought suit to recover one-half of the profits realized by Tinkle less commissions.
In his defense, Tinkle contended that because of the legal incapacity and
financial inability of the corporation to take advantage of the opportunity, it was
no longer a corporate opportunity. The charter imposed a debt limit of $250,000.00
and the corporation was practically without assets. Its credit position was such
that it could not have financed the undertaking without exceeding the debt limit.
The corporation had a $5,000.00 capital outlay and the transaction required
$800,000.00. The debt limit imposed by the charter was a legal bamer to any
transaction that would violate it. If Tnnkle, as an officer, had exceeded the debt
limit, he would have been liable for any loss sustained.' Furthermore, no bank
'3 FLE-rcnxa, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PpavAm CoPoRiATioNs, c-il,
sec. 862 (Penn. Ed. 1947).
Id. see. 862.1.
'311 Ky. 635, 224 S.W 2d 923 (1949).
'Federal Chemical Co. v. Paddock 264 Ky. 338, 94 S.W 2d 645 (1936);
Randolph v. Ballard County Bank, 142 Ky. 145, 134 S.W 165 (1911); see Phoe-
mx Third National Bank v. Martin, 219 Ky. 579, 293 S.W 1064 (1927).
